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suggestive in several areas. One is in addressing the broadly Aristotelian
vs. Stoic dispute over the relation between happiness and enjoyment. Can
one, by acting virtuously, suﬀer genuine harm (and thus not experience
flourishing in the sense of well-being), and still be “happy” in the morally rich sense of flourishing? On Porter’s interpretation of Aquinas, the
answer is a qualified, “yes.” Happiness and well-being are not equated;
the attainment of well-being is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for happiness. However, the happy life is normally and properly an enjoyable life;
the virtues and the capacities that they perfect are in fact aimed at the full
functioning of human nature, i.e., well-being. Such a view, says Porter,
“is at least suggestive that the joys and pleasures of the happy life are
intimately bound up with enjoyment of those goods which are proper to
the life of well-being” (p. 173). (Put diﬀerently, Aquinas’s understanding
of value does not, as some forms of consequentialism, reduce moral goods
(happiness) to non-moral goods (well-being); yet it is able to account for
the real goodness of the latter as well as its relation to the former.)
In Nature as Reason, Porter has added significantly to the goods to be
enjoyed in thinking about the natural law.

The Two Intellectual Worlds of John Locke, by John W. Yolton. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2004. $35.00 (cloth)
JEANINE GRENBERG, St. Olaf College
John Yolton takes on a diﬃcult task in this book: to convince us that John
Locke is not simply an empiricist, but that his thought is deeply and
centrally informed by more speculative and conjectural, even religious
and theological, concerns. Yolton is intrigued by pervasive references in
Locke’s Essay and other works to “things obscure, hidden, and even noble
and beautiful,” (p. 139) and this book is his eﬀort to convince us of the
centrality of such things in Locke’s philosophy.
Yolton’s audience is thus “those who still cling to labeling Locke ‘empiricist’ (of whom there are fewer today),” (p. 137) and also those who
tend to assume that Locke was interested only in attacking and rejecting central Christian doctrines. (p. 151) At the center of Yolton’s attack
against a narrowly empiricist and secular interpretation of Locke is the
claim that Locke is in fact concerned with two “intellectual worlds”, one
the more familiar, materialistic world accessed via sense experience and
observation; the other a less attended to Lockean world of “God, angels
and spirits” accessed (or more accurately, imagined or thought of) via
speculation and conjecture.
I am torn in trying to assess Yolton’s success in this task. On the one
hand, we are indebted to him for uncovering a host of interesting textual references in Locke’s works which suggest of Locke escaping his
empiricist bounds, and which enigmatically hint at a Lockean concern
for this second, more spiritual, intellectual world. For example, in the
Fourth Book of the Essay, Locke speaks of the goal of “natural philoso-
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phy” as “bare speculative Truth, and whatsoever can aﬀord the Mind of
Man any such, . . . whether it be God himself, Angels, Spirits, Bodies, or
any of their Aﬀections, as Number, and Figure, etc.” (Essay, 4.21.2, quoted
at p. 46) Similarly, Locke surprisingly for an empiricist, suggests that,
“[W]hatsoever we can reach with our Eyes, or our Thoughts . . . is but a
point, almost nothing, in comparison of the rest.” (Essay, 4.3.23, quoted
at p. 49) Yolton appeals not only to the Essay, but also to less familiar
works, including The Reasonableness of Christianity, “Of the Conduct of the
Understanding,” and Some Thoughts Concerning Education to make his argument. We should be grateful to him for amassing these citations for our
consideration, for they surely do raise interesting questions about Locke’s
basic philosophical orientation.
There are problems, however, with the extent to which these texts can
make Yolton’s case. First, with just a few notable exceptions, the texts to
which he appeals almost invariably make only indirect reference to a spiritual world, usually within the context of saying that we can say nothing
of this world, and so should be content not to. The larger, more positive
claims which Yolton hopes to draw from them thus sit on shaky textual
ground. When, for example, Locke speaks of the soul, it is usually within
the context of questioning the purported “’demonstrations and undoubted
Propositions’” about it which in fact fail to advance knowledge at all. (Essay, 4.8.9, quoted at p. 54) There are even times when texts which Yolton
finds “attention grabbing” for their non-empiricist flavor, leave the reader
cold, and perplexed at Yolton’s more vigorous response. He quotes, for
example, the following as indicating a deep concern for “things hidden
and unknown”:
And if there are things obscure, sublime, and noble, which even reason itself may marvel at and bring forth and proclaim as a discovery,
yet, if you would run through each single speculative science, there
is none in which something is not always presupposed and taken for
granted and derived from the senses by way of borrowing.” (Essays
on the Law of Nature, 151, quoted at p. 139)
This is less-than-convincing textual evidence for Locke’s positive concern
for things “obscure, sublime and noble.” Locke seems here to be introducing a deflationary, empiricist reading of things purported to be obscure,
sublime and noble, instead of indicating an awe-filled appreciation for such
spiritual entities.
Ultimately though, the larger problem with Yolton’s eﬀort is that it
doesn’t seem quite finished. There may indeed be secure textual basis for
some non-empiricist leanings in Locke, but the book we have before us
does not do enough with these intriguing texts to make that argument.
Indeed, at times the book reads in a draft-like, rather text-heavy fashion,
introducing copious references from Locke which go uninterpreted. When
we do receive interpretation, it is often in a more lexicon-like style, cataloguing the use of individual words (e.g., “person”, “soul”, “creature”) in
Locke’s texts, but not convincing us of a larger, positive program of speculative or spiritual concern. And often, discussions of individual bits of text
end with a query, or hesitant suggestion, rather than a conclusion. For ex-
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ample, Yolton ends a discussion of the happiness of God by saying: “Perhaps the happiness of spirits (and God) is just their superior knowledge.”
(p. 82, emphasis added)
In the end, Yolton has succeeded in intriguing me, but not convincing
me. It is at best an uphill battle to engage in the task which Yolton has undertaken for himself, and it may be that he has done the best that could be
done with what is to be found in Locke’s text. But if there are speculative,
theological and spiritual concerns positively informing Locke’s philosophy,
we have yet to fully uncover it.

Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction, edited by Sohail H. Hashmi and
Stephen Lee. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, xiii + 533
pages, $85.00 hardback, $37.99 paperback.
TOMIS KAPITAN, Northern Illinois University
This book is devoted to ethical issues concerning the use, deployment,
possession, and regulation of so-called “weapons of mass destruction”
(WMD). The topics are approached from a broad range of theoretical and
practical perspectives, with nearly half the space given to the views of six
major religious traditions. Also included are essays representing political
realism, natural law ethics, liberalism, feminism, and pacifism. Contributors were asked to address six questions:
• What are the general norms concerning the use of weapons in war?
• Is it ever justified to use WMD in warfare?
• Is it ever justified to develop and deploy WMD as deterrents?
• If some nations possess WMD, is it proper to deny possession to
others?
• Should there be a WMD disarmament?
• What are the policy options of the major ethical traditions concerning WMD?
This technique serves not only to distinguish major positions, depending
on how these questions are answered, but also to facilitate comparison
among the represented viewpoints. For the most part, the volume is historically sophisticated, sensitive to contemporary political concerns, and
replete with state of the art thinking about the ethics of WMD. With its
breadth and thorough index, it would be an excellent text for use in courses
devoted to war, violence, and international conflict.
The editors note that there is some diﬃculty in determining what counts
as WMD. Typically, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are cited,
but the question has been raised whether such mechanisms as economic
sanctions and machetes shouldn’t also be included, since both were used
to destroy hundreds of thousands of lives in the 1990s. Perhaps the best
distinction between WMD and “conventional” weapons is that the former

